To understand what is happening in Lebanon now, we must go back to before the disgraceful statements of Information Minister George Kordahi, which came as the drop that overflowed the cup.
Internally, the “Hezbollah” militia carried out a political raid on the hard core hostile to it. First, for about two years, I started trying to target Banque du Liban Governor Riad Salameh, but the attempt failed miserably. Then the party moved, trying to subjugate the judiciary by targeting investigator Tariq Bitar, but the attempt ended, to date, in a dead end. After that, the party invented the “Ain al-Remmaneh Battle,” and its goal was to intimidate Christians. The result was counterproductive, especially after the events of Shuya and Khaldeh. The party tried to exploit its military defeat by hitting two birds with one stone: the Lebanese Forces Party and the army command, meaning what was left of the hard core, but this investment , gone unheeded.
The party has lost in all its attacks on the hard core: Riad Salameh is still the governor of the Banque du Liban, the army leadership is intact, Tariq Bitar is completing his investigations into the port bombing, and Samir Geagea is neither prosecuted nor convicted of anything and enjoys a remarkable celebration locally and abroad, as well as the collapse of the barriers of prestige and fear. From the party in Shweya, Khalde and Ain al-Rummaneh, walls of hatred and anger against the party and its elements replaced them.
But targeting the hard core is a dangerous act, and indicates the party’s hidden desire to swallow up all of Lebanon and end it to turn into a purely Iranian province.
The party is spreading among its audience a number of illusions, such as that it will emerge victorious as a result of the Saudi-Iranian dialogue project and the US-Iranian Vienna negotiations. His most important claim: that Saudi Arabia and its allies are in retreat, while Iran and its followers are in the lead.
But the course of the George Qardahi crisis revealed a number of opposite facts, supported by a joint US-British-German-French statement: The Vienna negotiations will not succeed if Iran does not change its behavior in the region and in the world. On the other hand, the Saudi foreign minister said clearly: The core of the Qardahi crisis is Hezbollah’s domination of Lebanon, and that the talks with Iran are friendly, but they have not made any progress, and the Kingdom has nothing to do with the survival or departure of the Mikati government, but “Qardahiya” statements were not addressed by Accepted by the government in accordance with the official rules approved as required.
add to that:
1- The problem is not between the Lebanese government and the Kingdom alone… Behind the Kingdom are the Gulf states combined.
2- The Gulf move coincides with US sanctions against Lebanese personalities.
3- The Lebanese reactions are angry at the party’s policies, and at the thawing of the gaps between it and the state.
What does it all mean?
First, the Gulf states say what this means is that any talks or negotiations between the Gulf states and Iran do not mean the legalization of the militarized militias.
Secondly, the international community is saying what this means is that the Vienna negotiations are an issue that Lebanon or Hezbollah has nothing to do with.
Third, the Gulf states and the international community say what this means is that the war on the militarized militias, headed by “Hezbollah”, continues with a variety of forms and means.
Fourth, Hezbollah’s attack on the hard core hostile to it will not go unpunished, and for every action there is a reaction equal in magnitude and opposite in direction, so it was necessary to determine the sizes.
After determining the sizes in Lebanon, “Hezbollah” is in great trouble, as it cannot compensate the Lebanese for the Gulf states, and it was previously unable to present a convincing case to its audience in Shwayya, Khaldeh and Ain Al-Rummaneh, the investigation of Al-Bitar, the survival of Riad Salameh and the independence of the army command… Therefore. It is likely that he will turn to further escalation against the Lebanese, whether by rejecting Qardahi’s resignation or by resigning in solidarity with him in the event of his resignation, and thus flouting the government, then the elections, and perhaps igniting a civil or regional war, all so that he does not reveal his shame in the bombing of the port, and hide his retreat Popular or charter, and so that his audience does not demand him to spend the slogans of “divine victory” in electricity, gasoline, medicine, currency, and a decent and respectful life with the other at home and abroad.
The other path for the party is more bitter than escalation: to recognize the reality of its size locally and regionally, and to retreat and concede, whether through the resignation of Qardahi or the birth of a real independent government that fixes what the party has corrupted and puts an end to its excesses. Its members are figures that the party has sought for a decade and a half to market to its environment as agents, terrorists or corrupt But if the blame comes to you from the militia, then this means that you are right as an individual or as a state.
The firm measures taken by the Gulf states and the international community, regardless of the details and quantities, were necessary to protect the Lebanese from the party, to expose it more in front of the Lebanese before others, and to hold the party responsible for its actions in Lebanon and the region. If the party succeeded in devouring the hard core hostile to it, the Lebanon that we knew would have ended completely, and all hope for its restoration would have been lost, and God is dominant over it, but most people do not know.